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An analysis of Indonesia's transfer
system: recent performance and future
prospects
Bambang Brodjonegoro and Jorge MartinezVazquez

INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970s, fiscal decentralization in Indonesia had been a slowburning affair. However, with the 'Big Bang' of the 1999 reforms, in the
space of one year Indonesia changed from one of the most centralized to one
of the most decentralized countries in the world. It was with significant
trepidation that observers saw the share of sub-national government spending
in total government spending almost double from 2000 to 2001, to over 30
percent, and at the same time over two million civil servants and thousands of
facilities were re-assigned to local level. However, the widespread concerns
about chaos and disarray did not materialize. The transition to the new
decentralized system had some bumps, but overall was fairly smooth.
In hindsight, there are many reasons for this largely successful transition.
There is little doubt that, despite some defects, the institutional framework
for fiscal decentralization, laid out in Laws No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999,
deserves much credit for the success. The centerpiece for the new fiscal
decentralization institutions in Indonesia is the new system of transfers com
prising revenue sharing of natural resources, personal income tax, and property
taxes, the DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum) a large unconditional grant intended to
fund sub-national governments in an equalizing manner, and the DAK (Dana
Alokasi Khusus), a set of yet to-be-developed conditional grants.
In this chapter we examine the performance of this transfer system. We
first discuss the history of transfers in Indonesia. We next review the structure
and performance of the new system of transfers in Indonesia, and then focus
on the unfinished agenda for reform. Our main conclusion is that, with the
development and initiation of the DAU in 2001, the government of Indonesia
(GOI) got the fundamental concepts right but also got many of the particular
details wrong. The performance of the DAU was hindered by several choices
159
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made in the implementation of the new system, the most important being an
extremely rigid interpretation of the 'hold harmless' provision. The GOI
proceeded to reform the DAU for 2002, and, although real improvements
were made, some important issues still remain, including how the new sys
tem should move away from the suffocating grip of the hold harmless provision.
Also, the GOI faces important challenges but also good opportunities in
shaping and increasing the importance of the DAK conditional grant system.
With respect to revenue sharing on a derivation basis, we recommend that the
GOI should not develop it further, but instead it should focus on developing
the revenue autonomy of sub-national governments.1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA
Transfer systems have a long history in Indonesia. From the time of inde
pendence in 1945, Indonesia's experience with intergovernmental fiscal finance
can be classified into three periods: a pre-SDO period, an SDO period and the
current DAU period.
The pre-SDO period extends from 1945 to 1972. During this time, there
were many forms of intergovernmental transfers, often introduced to reduce
tensions between central and local governments. Until 1956, the stated goal
was to ensure local governments had the ability to finance their planned
budget deficits through central government subsidies. Not surprisingly, cen
tral government was not able to operate the system and largely had to avoid
its original commitment. In 1956, the government issued Law No. 32/1956
with a defined concept of intergovernmental fiscal transfers based on a for
mula. This proved to be too advanced for the time and never got off the
ground, but the Law was not canceled until 1999.
From 1956 to 1964, the central government introduced a tax revenue
sharing scheme in which local governments received some percentage of
central government tax revenue. In 1965, the central government replaced the
tax sharing system with direct subsidies that were based on the total wage bill
of local governments. The scheme was called the 'intergovernmental subsidy
system,' and it would become the basic concept later applied in the Subsidi
Daerah Otonom (SDO), or Autonomous Region Subsidy. Over approximately
the same period (1965-74), central government applied other types of inter
governmental transfers, such as central government contributions to local
governments, development assistance funds, natural resources revenue shar
ing (in terms of royalties for forestry products), and land rent for mining
activities. However, these other transfers often lacked an adequate legal basis.
The SDO system was first fully implemented in 1972/73. The core concept
behind the SDO was that central government would fully support the costs of
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local government employees. Two-thirds of the SDO was allocated to provin
cial governments, and the rest was for the district/municipality governments.
The SDO is best classified as a specific purpose or conditional grant with no
discretion at local government level. Aside from the SDO, local governments
also received Instruksi Presiden, or INPRES transfers, which were earmarked
for local development activities. An important objective of the INPRES system
was to reduce regional disparities, and its allocation was based on several
criteria such as population, local own revenue (PAD), a minimum transfer per
local government, area, previous transfers, and so on. In reality, there were
many types of INPRES grants. Some of them could be classified as specific
purpose grants (e.g. INPRES for basic education, health services, reforesta
tion, or small retailers). Others could be classified as general purpose or
block grants (e.g. INPRES for provincial development, district/municipality
development, or village development). General purpose (or block) INPRES
grants generally had larger funding than specific purpose INPRES grants.
Both SDO and INPRES were Indonesia's transfer system until the introduc
tion of the DAU in 2001.2

THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA
Law No. 25/1999 introduced three types of intergovernmental transfers: rev
enue sharing, the DAU, or General Allocation Fund, and the DAK, or Specific
Allocation Fund. We will consider each in turn.
Revenue Sharing
Three types of taxes are currently shared between the central and sub-na
tional governments on a modified derivation basis. These are natural resource
taxes, personal income tax, and property taxes (the property tax or PBB, and
the land transfer fee or BPHTB). The most significant of the three is natural
resources revenue sharing. This is a new type of revenue sharing, introduced
by Law No. 25/1999 with the intention of compensating natural resource-rich
regions that had felt unfairly exploited during the Soeharto era and that more
recently had demonstrated their aspirations to controlling and benefiting from
the natural resources in their territories. There are four natural resource
commodities whose tax revenues are shared between central and local gov
ernments: gas and oil, general mining, forestry and fishery. At the sub-national
level of government, there is revenue sharing among the provincial govern
ments, the producing district/municipal governments, and other district/
municipal governments within provinces. The revenue sharing rates for natu
ral resource taxes are shown in Table 8.1.
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Revenue sharing of natural resources has remained controversial since
Law No. 25/1999 because several of the resource-rich regions still seemed to
believe that they were not getting a fair share. One part of the problem has
been the lack of transparency in the calculations of total revenues from
natural resources, and another has been the sharing rates.
In response to the tensions surrounding the sharing of natural resource
revenues, central government approved in 2001 special regimes for the most
politically assertive provinces, Aceh and Papua. These laws represented the
first important instance in which central government legally accepted asym
metric treatment of subnational governments.3 Aceh's Special Autonomy
Law No. 18/2001 gives this province an additional 55 percent of petroleum
taxes and 40 percent of gas taxes, compared to the standard 15 percent and 30
percent, respectively. This means that the special autonomy scheme gives
Aceh 70 percent of oil and gas revenue sharing. Papua's Special Autonomy
Law No. 21/2001 applies a similar proportion.4 In both special autonomy
laws, the whole additional revenue from petroleum and gas taxes will be
received directly by their respective provincial governments and the provin
cial governments will be responsible for allocating the fund to all of their
kabupaten and municipalities using their own formula.
Revenue sharing for personal income tax was first introduced with the
1999 reforms. Property tax and land transfer fee revenues were already
shared between central and local governments prior to the 1999 reform.
Through the revision of income tax law (Law No. 17/2000), central govern
ment added personal income tax (including payroll tax) to the tax sharing
scheme, where 80 percent of personal income tax revenues are still retained
by central government and the rest goes to provincial (8 percent) and district/
municipal governments (12 percent).5 Table 8.2 gives the sharing rates for
other taxes.
Revenue sharing on a derivation basis is helping with general funding of
sub-national governments, and thus is being used as a way to address vertical
imbalances in Indonesia. Revenue sharing is also being used to address the
important political issue of redressing perceived past injustices toward natu
ral resource-endowed regions. But revenue sharing can also be a source of
problems, the most serious of which is increasing fiscal disparities; however,
this is a problem that can be addressed through equalization transfers. It is
notable that Indonesia has avoided so far the problems associated with rev
enue sharing arising from the difficulty encountered with the fair apportionment
of taxes such as VAT or corporate income tax. It was a wise decision not to
share those taxes with sub-national governments, and it should be kept that
way.
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Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU), or the General Allocation Fund
The DAU is by far the most important type of transfer in Indonesia, and
finances approximately three-fourths of sub-national government expendi
tures. The DAU can be classified as a general purpose grant that gives full
discretion to local governments to spend the funds according to their priori
ties. The DAU is a well-developed equalization grant system with explicit
funding rules and formulas for the distribution of the funds. The overall pool
of funds comes from 25 percent of net domestic revenues (or total domestic
revenue minus revenue sharing) in the central government budget. From that
amount, provinces receive 10 percent and district/municipal governments 90
percent. Details of the formula used for the allocation of DAU in 2001 and
2002 are shown in Appendix 8.1. The formula is practically identical for
provinces and district/municipal governments.
The basic concept behind the DAU formula is the fiscal gap, or the differ
ence between measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity for each
local government. The expenditure needs for each jurisdiction are approxi
mated by applying a weighted index of four variables (population, area, cost
differences, and poverty) to the average expenditure for all jurisdictions. The
fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction is approximated by adding an estimate of
its own revenues to the actual revenues from shared taxes.
In fact, however, only 20 percent of the DAU overall funds were allocated
through the formula in 2001; in 2002 this figure increased, but only to 40
percent. The rest of the DAU funds were allocated to the provinces and
districts/municipalities on the basis of two additional sets of factors. The first
factor was a lump sum or equal amount that each jurisdiction (province and
district/municipality) received during the fiscal year. The lump-sum factor
represented 10 percent of the total DAU funds in 2002, as specified by
Parliament.6 The lump-sum factor has been justified as covering fixed or
overhead costs of the jurisdictions. However, it is feared that this has given an
incentive for the further fragmentation of local governments.
The second additional factor governing the final allocation of the DAU is
the so-called 'balancing factor,' predicated on the basis of a 'hold harmless'
condition. The balancing factor for 2001 was proposed by the Ministry of
Finance and applied only to the districts and municipalities, and assured that
every district/municipality received a minimum transfer equal to 130 percent
of the SDO funds and 110 percent of the INPRES funds it got in 2000. This
second factor took the bulk of the DAU funds in 2001. The interpretation of
the hold harmless provision in 2002 was demanded by Parliament as meaning
that no jurisdiction would get less than the funds it got in 2001. This meant
that in addition to the 10 percent of the DAU going to the lump sum factor, an
additional 50 percent of the DAU went to the balancing factor in 2002. The
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funds of the balancing factor in 2002 were distributed among local govern
ments in proportion to their relative wage bill for public employees.7 As will
be discussed further, the balancing factor could have worked against the
objective of equalization in the DAU,8 but also introduced in 2002 an incen
tive for local governments to hire more employees and to spend more on
salaries.
Law No. 25/1999 emphasized the equalization role of the DAU, but in
reality the DAU has served several objectives other than equalization. By
virtue of the 'balancing factor,' all jurisdictions receive a DAU amount no
matter how well off they are. This means that the DAU functions as a general
funding mechanism to address vertical imbalances. The DAU is also being
used as a way to redress historical injustices.9
A recent government regulation requires that local governments report on
the uses of the DAU on a quarterly basis. This regulation raises the question
of whether the DAU will remain an unconditional grant in the future. We will
discuss the possibility of transforming some of the funds now used for the
balancing factor into conditional grants. However, the question with report
ing requirements and even more so with any conditionality is whether the
central authorities have the means to monitor and enforce them.
Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK), or the Specific Allocation Fund
Law No. 25/1999 introduces specific purpose, or conditional, grants for two
types of objectives: to help fund important needs which cannot be incorpo
rated in the DAU formula10 and to provide funding for activities which relate
to national priorities or commitments.11 A third category contemplated as part
of the DAK is a mechanism for intergovernmental sharing of forest exploita
tion fees.
The DAK is still a minor part of Indonesia's system of intergovernmental
transfers. The DAK is seen in law as a conditional matching grant, and local
governments receiving DAK funds are supposed to provide at least 10 per
cent of the total amount of the project on their own.12 The source of funding
for the DAK is the central government budget, except for reforestation activi
ties, which are covered directly by fees from the reforestation fund.13
Except for reforestation funds, the DAK system was not used in either
2001 or 2002. Two questions arise. First, from where is the funding for the
DAK to come? One answer commonly offered is that some of the develop
ment expenditures now going through central government agencies could be
transformed into conditional grants as part of the DAK (Hofman et al., 2002).
Another possibility is to use some of the funds now used as the balancing
factor in the DAU as funding for conditional grants in the DAK. This issue is
not yet resolved. Second, on what basis should the DAK be allocated? The
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approach for DAK allocation is vague in the Law, and this lack of transpar
ency may eventually raise questions of arbitrariness. Several approaches are
possible to bring transparency in the DAK. The funds may be distributed as
part of national sectoral programs, which may include investments in capital
infrastructure and could be distributed according to clear and objective crite
ria summarized in explicit formulas. DAK funds may also be used as
contingency funds for natural disasters. Regardless, rules should be estab
lished for the annual allocation, the authority to disburse, and the final
disposition. In general, DAK funds should be distributed to achieve central
government goals such as stimulating regional spending on activities of na
tional interest or addressing externalities across regional governments;
redistribution need not be emphasized if the DAU does a sufficient job in
equalizing fiscal disparities. In this regard, remember that during 2001 and
2002 the DAU was severely constrained in its equalization role. If these
constraints continue in the future, then it may be necessary to consider an
equalization role for the DAK.
Recent Changes in the DAU
A remarkable feature of the new system of transfers in Indonesia has been an
officially guided process of rigorous examination and improvement. This is
good because the short time available to put together the DAU in 2000, from
principles to the most concrete details of implementation, inevitably meant
that the new transfer system would have problems. These problems were
indeed numerous. However, the DAU also got may things right, and these
were in general the very fundamental aspects of the transfer system (MartinezVazquez, 2001).
The accomplishments of the DAU in 2001 were in three areas. First, the
government used a transparent rule for how to fund the DAU, and also clearly
established the division of the overall pool of funds between the two tiers of
regional governments, the districts/municipalities and the provinces; this fund
ing rule was kept for the second year. Second, the formula used for the DAU
looked at the difference between estimated expenditure needs and revenue
capacity as opposed to actual expenditures and actual revenues of regional
governments. This avoided moral hazard problems of providing incentives to
regional governments to spend more and collect too little in an attempt to
increase their DAU allocations. Third, the DAU used a phased-in approach,
although the 'hold harmless' provision was carried too far.
There were also in 2001 several questions and several problems with the
DAU. There were questions about the adequacy of the DAU overall funding
at 25 percent of central government domestic revenues, as well as questions
about ways to improve on the variables used in the estimation of fiscal or
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expenditure needs and the weights attached to them.14 Among other prob
lems, the DAU formula lacked aggregate consistency because some of the
variables in the definition of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs were not
properly scaled. Another problem was that the computation of fiscal capacity
applied an index of industry, natural resources, and human resources, equally
weighted, both to 'local own revenues' and to 'shared revenues.' Instead, the
index should have been applied only to 'local own revenues'; the other
component, 'shared revenues', should have been entered in the formula di
rectly as forecast by the government authorities. The reason for using an
estimate for fiscal capacity is that there exists a moral hazard problem with
using direct estimates of revenues. When direct estimates of revenues are
used in the formula, local governments are given an incentive to collect less
revenue by lowering tax enforcement and administration efforts, by lowering
tax rates, or modifying the tax base (assuming they have discretion over any
of those dimensions of actual revenue effort). In the case of Indonesia, local
governments have some discretion over the level of tax effort they can exer
cise for local own revenues. However, they have no discretion at all over
shared revenues. This of course raises the question of whether local govern
ments with a negative fiscal gap would receive zero funds from the DAU.15
During the first few months of the implementation of the DAU in 2001, it
became clear that the government would have to review an important issue
related not to the structure of the DAU but rather to its implementation
process. This was the 'hold harmless' provision. The analysis used to back up
the quantification of the 'balancing factor' had been incomplete, and ulti
mately led to erroneous policy because the budgetary position of local
governments in 2001 was very different from their respective position in
2000. There were big differences arising from major changes in expenditure
assignments, as specified in Law No. 22/1999, and from changes in revenue
assignments, including revenue sharing in natural resources. Therefore, pro
viding regional governments with transfers at least equal to the SDO and
INPRES funds they got in 2000 did not guarantee they were held harmless in
the new fiscal environment of 2000. The 'hold harmless' provision should
have been framed better by comparing the old plus new expenditure assign
ments (where the latter should have been costed at the level of funding
required in the last year before those responsibilities had been decentralized)
against own regional government revenues plus new resources from revenue
sharing plus new transfers from DAU and special allocation grants; the DAU
and special allocation grants should have been at least as large as the SDO
and INPRES transfers in 2000. However, it must be noted that even this
would not have been sufficient to hold harmless local governments; that is,
the DAU transfers in 2001 may have exceeded the SDO and INPRES trans
fers in 2000, but the remainder may have been less than the funding required
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for the new expenditure assignments net of revenue sharing. On the other
hand, some regional governments may have received so much more funding
through revenue sharing in 2001 that they would have been held harmless
even without DAU transfers. In such cases, holding harmless would not have
required the transfer of funds equivalent to SDO and INPRES received in
2000, when there was no revenue sharing.
Even though it was not possible to phase out the hold harmless provision in
the 2002 DAU, the reformed DAU represents a marked improvement over the
2001 DAU. The major improvement occurred on the revenue side. In 2002,
all revenue components reflected capacity coming either from actual revenue
sharing or from estimated local capacity. On the expenditure side, progress
has been slower due to limited data availability.

THE RATIONALES FOR TRANSFERS IN INDONESIA
There are several reasons for intergovernmental transfers, both in general and
in the specific case of Indonesia. This section considers these justifications.
To Correct Vertical Imbalances
One of the most important objectives of the intergovernmental transfer sys
tem in Indonesia is to reduce vertical imbalances. The decentralization process
has transferred significant expenditure responsibilities to sub-national gov
ernments, which now require more reliable sources of financing. The questions,
of course, are whether there is a vertical imbalance now in Indonesia, and, if
so, how significant this imbalance is.
There is no unique definition of vertical imbalances. Broadly speaking, a
vertical imbalance arises when there is no correspondence between the ex
penditure responsibilities and the revenue sources assigned to each level of
government. Several approaches are used to measure the presence and impor
tance of vertical imbalances.
One approach is to identify the existence of persistent budget deficits at a
particular level of government. Here, the size and persistence of the deficits is
taken as prima facie evidence of such an imbalance. Independently of its
accuracy, this diagnostic tool cannot be used for Indonesia because there is
no information available on sub-national government deficits for recent years.16
Another approach is to quantify expenditure needs or requirements at differ
ent levels of government and then to compare them to available resources. One
possible outcome here is that both central government and sub-national govern
ments are short of funds, since there is inherent ambiguity associated with the
expenditure levels (quantity and quality of services) that can be associated with
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the assignment of expenditure responsibilities at each level of government. One
way currently being debated in Indonesia of dealing with this ambiguity is to
do an exhaustive listing of standards or norms for provision and to conduct an
accounting of the expenditures required for explicitly stated and agreed upon
levels and quality of public services. This approach is very costly and time
consuming, and also requires a significant degree of intergovernmental consen
sus and communication. Without these, the listing and costing of expenditure
norms can lead to intergovernmental friction and poor budgeting practice.17
A third approach to identifying vertical imbalances is to examine to what
extent different levels of government are able to finance expenditures from
their own sources of revenues. The attraction of this approach is that it by
passes the uncertainty surrounding any measurement of government needs. A
simple and effective guarantee against vertical imbalance is to provide each
level of government with enough revenue autonomy so that they can make
their own decisions regarding what services to cover and at what level. By
this measure, there is considerable vertical imbalance against sub-national
governments in Indonesia.
Current local tax power only contributes a small proportion of the total tax
revenue in Indonesia, and it is far from enough to finance most of the new
expenditure responsibilities transferred to local governments. Table 8.3 shows
that local own revenue (local taxes and charges) only contributed between 34 percent during the two fiscal years, 2000 and 2001. Clearly, it will be
impossible for local governments in Indonesia to finance their basic needs or
basic expenditures if their sources are only local own revenues.

Table 8.3

Fiscal year
1998/00
1999/00
2000
2001*

Central and local fiscal indicators, 1998-2001 (in percent)
Local/total
expenditure

Local own/
total revenue

Intergovernmental transfer/
total local expenditure

15.81
16.61
17.88
24.82

3.31
3.63
3.10
3.80

97.19
79.23
85.87
103.04

Notes:
Total expenditure = National expenditures - Intergovernmental transfer + Total local expendi
ture
Total revenue = National revenue + Local own revenue
Local revenue = Local own revenue + Intergovernmental transfer
* Estimated data for 2001 using proposed budget.
Source:

Authors' calculations.
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The current practice in Indonesia of measuring vertical imbalances has
been to examine whether the 25 percent funding for the DAU, together with
own revenues (PAD) and shared revenues, has been enough to finance old
and new expenditure responsibilities. Often, even this practice reduces to
examining whether the cost of personnel attached to a level of government
can be covered by the overall funds made available to that level of govern
ment. The most authoritative study of this question is by Lewis (2001), who
concludes that, while provincial government may have been a bit short in
2001, the districts/municipalities were amply funded. Clearly, the transfer
system, especially the DAU, plays a key role in reducing the possible vertical
fiscal imbalances between central and local governments.
To Reduce Horizontal Imbalances
Horizontal imbalances arise from existing fiscal disparities across sub-na
tional jurisdictions. Sub-national governments generally have different tax
capacities because they differ in their economic bases. In Indonesia there are
significant disparities in gross regional product per capita (GDRP 1999 per
capita). At district/municipality level (Table 8.4), the coefficient of variation
in 1999 was 2.12, and the maximum value was 172 times higher than the
minimum value. At provincial level, the corresponding values are lower, with
a coefficient of variation of 0.93 and a gap between maximum and minimum
of 16 times (Table 8.5).
There are also significant disparities for actual revenues collected. For
example, the coefficient of variation for districts/municipalities for own rev
enues per capita in 1999 (Total collection per capita in Table 8.4) is 2.24 and
for shared revenues in 2001 (Revenue share per capita in Table 8.4) is 2.91.
The coefficients of variation for these two variables for the provinces are a bit
lower but still quite high.
Horizontal fiscal imbalances also may exist because of disparities across
sub-national jurisdictions in expenditure needs. The differences in needs may
arise from either different prices or costs of service provision or from differ
ent shares of the population with special needs. Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show that
there is little variation in price levels as measured by the construction price
index (Const index). However, there are significant disparities in the inci
dence of population living under the poverty level (Pet poor) and other
expenditure need-generating features, such as the percent of the population of
school age, the percent of the population that is elderly, and population
density. Disparities in both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs highlight
the important role equalization transfers need to play in Indonesia.

Table 8.4

District/municipality disparities in revenues and fiscal capacity (in thousands of rupiahs)

Mean

Standard
deviation

Coefficient
of variation

Maximum

Minimum

4 901.20

10 372.08

2.12

147 676.76

856.50

Total collection 1999 per capita
Revenue share 2001 per capita

22.42
157.12

50.31
457.23

2.24
2.91

855.25
4 853.57

0.30
6.41

DAU 2001 per capita
After DAU 2001 per capita
After all transfer 2001 per capita
Regional revenue 2001 per capita
DAU 2001 (% of expenditure)

445.19
467.61
624.73
637.39
96.95

365.02
369.80
721.56
719.41
23.97

0.82
0.79
1.15
1.13
0.25

3 376.53
3 395.64
6 984.57
6 984.57
203.67

89.68
105.33
137.76
142.46
42.74

DAU 2002 per capita
After DAU 2002 per capita
After all transfer 2002 per capita
Regional revenue 2002 per capita

522.55
544.96
702.08
710.83

393.35
398.66
727.77
729.76

0.75
0.73
1.04
1.03

3 376.53
3 395.64
7 041.28
7 048.95

110.76
128.81
160.19
162.53

Expenditures 2001 per capita

453.97

309.72

0.68

2 934.81

100.70

Variable
GRDP 1999 per capita

Source:

Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables.

Table 8.5

Province disparities in revenues and fiscal capacity (in thousands of rupiahs)

Mean

Standard
deviation

Coefficient
of variation

Maximum

Minimum

4 977.53

4 614.32

0.93

23 465.08

1 429.58

23.73
42.14

38.56
93.79

1.62
2.23

201.90
412.51

5.22
3.14

DAU 2001 per capita
After DAU 2001 per capita
After all transfer 2001 per capita
Regional revenue 2001 per capita
DAU 2001 (% of expenditure)

50.03
70.60
112.74
125.96
62.66

30.80
50.32
132.72
132.75
87.43

0.62
0.71
1.18
1.05
1.40

151.47
271.93
572.30
594.46
414.19

13.02
17.65
25.88
26.08
18.26

DAU 2002 per capita
After DAU 2002 per capita
After all transfer 2002 per capita
Regional revenue 2002 per capita

72.31
92.88
135.02
140.46

50.88
59.10
121.40
131.80

0.70
0.64
0.90
0.94

185.21
265.83
566.20
594.50

11.10
19.37
27.60
27.60

Expenditures 2001 per capita

130.50

84.11

0.64

301.87

4.26

Variable
GRDP 1999 per capita
Total collection 1999 per capita
Revenue share 2001 per capita

Source:

See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables.
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Table 8.6

District/municipality disparities in expenditure needs

Variable

Mean

Pet poor (%)
Pet labour (%)
Pet school age (%)
Pet old (%)
Pet young (%)
Area (km)
Density (per km)
Const index
Source:

Coefficient
of variation

Maximum

Minimum

24.53
39.85
15.80
3.45
28.55

15.25
7.37
4.81
1.98
6.64

0.62
0.18
0.30
0.58
0.23

91.12
77.05
41.31
10.14
44.46

0.99
13.25
4.18
0.05
12.10

5 763.13
976.75
135.27

10 712.69
1 894.20
18.51

1.86
1.94
0.14

119 749.00
12 744.48
258.90

16.46
0.86
113.20

Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables.

Table 8.7

Province disparities in expenditure needs

Variable

Mean

Pet poor (%)
Pet labour (%)
Pet school age (%)
Pet old (%)
Pet young (%)
Area (km)
Density (per km)
Const index
Source:

Standard
deviation

Standard
deviation

Coefficient
of variation

Maximum

Minimum

24.58
41.58
17.58
3.18
30.68

12.64
12.12
6.51
1.54
10.59

0.51
0.29
0.37
0.49
0.35

55.81
88.11
44.71
7.96
73.14

4.53
23.35
9.12
0.88
16.34

64 569.1
648.71
134.82

81 718.08
2 294.68
14.77

1.27
3.54
0.11

414 039.95
12 673.22
203.44

661.62
5.28
116.34

Authors' computations. See Appendix 8.2 for a full definition of all variables.

To Address Externalities and Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Central
Government Policy Objectives, and the Implementation of National
Programs at Local Level
Indonesia currently has no conditional transfers. Most countries use some
form of conditional transfers in support of sub-national governments for
expenditure areas such as roads, water and sewerage treatment plants, trans
portation, housing, education, health, and so on. However, there is considerable
variety across countries in the objectives pursued and the actual structural
design of capital transfers. An important sub-category of conditional grants is
that of capital transfers. The typical country has a variety of capital transfers
that are closed-funded in the national budget, provide earmarked funds within
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specific capital expenditures and, as is the case for the DAK in Indonesia,
require some level of matching funds from sub-national governments.18 The
funds are commonly allocated either by an objective formula or on a specific
project basis.
Conditional transfers and capital transfers may be used for many different
objectives. Common objectives for conditional transfers include:
•
•
•

•

addressing externalities at sub-national level because of spillover ef
fects of some services or infrastructure across sub-national jurisdictions;
addressing vertical imbalances in the assignment of revenues in favor
of central authorities;
addressing limitations with borrowing at sub-national level either be
cause of borrowing limits and other restrictions or because of lack of
credit availability;
rewarding sub-national expenditure in areas of particular national im
portance or in support of national programs actually implemented at
regional and local levels.

In the case of Indonesia, expenditure responsibilities for health and educa
tion for example are at sub-national level as mandated in Law No. 22/1999. If
these services produce positive externalities, it is likely that local govern
ments may currently be under-spending on them. Since the DAU is not
intended to accommodate specific central government objectives, the govern
ment will have to rely on the DAK. However, some parts of central government
still feel strongly that it is not appropriate to promote the DAK mechanism in
pursuing national objectives. Instead, they favor a deconcentration mecha
nism in the form of Daftar Isian Proyek (DIP), or Development Project List.
The total deconcentrated fund is not very far behind the total funds allocated
to intergovernmental transfers. The persistence of the DIP is seen by many
observers as an indication that central agencies still want to show their power
in the regions.
Note that the use of central government funds earmarked exclusively for
capital investment at sub-national level means that central authorities have
identified a need to enhance capital expenditures at sub-national level, as
opposed to recurrent or ordinary expenditures. This need may arise from the
existence of externalities across sub-national jurisdictions or from financing
constraints sub-national governments face vis-k-vis lumpy capital expendi
tures.19 Often, central authorities have a bias toward earmarking a large share
of central government transfers for capital expenditures at sub-national level.
This reflects an ingrained belief that capital expenditures are always more
efficient than recurrent expenditures. Of course, there are no sound bases for
this extreme position. The production of public services requires different
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recurrent and capital input mixes, and the optimal mix should basically
reflect the prices of different inputs and the physical requirements of avail
able technologies.20 From an equity viewpoint, capital transfers may be used
to redress inequities in the distribution of capital infrastructure that arose in
the past.21

HOW HAS INDONESIA'S NEW TRANSFER SYSTEM
PERFORMED TO DATE?
Has Budget Autonomy Been Preserved?
One of the basic principles in the Indonesian decentralization process has
been to give greater autonomy to local governments in managing their own
budgets. Although it is true that the vast majority of revenue sources for subnational governments are under the control of central authorities, local
governments seem to have a significant degree_of discretion to spend the
funds according to their budget priorities, once the money is in their hands.22
Ironically, local governments have been slow in moving away from past
practices. Many local governments during 2001 appeared to have thought
that the DAU was intended to pay all local civil servant salaries as the SDO
did in the past. This misconception of course has been reinforced in 2002 by
the computation of the 'balancing factor' on the basis of the past wage bill.
Has Revenue Adequacy for Provinces and Districts/Municipalities Been
Maintained?
The new system of transfers has gone a long way toward ensuring 'revenue
adequacy' during the past two years. As we have seen, the most significant
component of the DAU allocations in 2001 and 2002 was the 'hold harmless'
provision. These funds were supposed to allow local governments to pay all
of their local civil servants, including the ones transferred from the central
government offices in 2001. In addition, central government budgeted for a
'contingency fund' in 2001 and again in 2002 to allow for additional finance
needed by local governments with a mismatch between transferred personnel
and available fiscal resources.23
The claims for additional resources by local governments during 2001 had
several sources. First, the transfer of central government employees was not
entirely smooth, and many provincial governments ended up with more trans
ferred employees than expected. Second, there was a (convenient) misconception
among local governments that only DAU funds could be used to pay local civil
servants. Even though some local governments had additional sources of
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revenues such as from revenue sharing, they refused to use those additional
funds to pay their employees' salaries. Third, in the middle of 2001, central
government suddenly mandated an increase in civil servant salaries, retroactive
to January 1. This policy affected all civil servant salaries without any exception,
and imposed an additional obligation on local governments. Because the DAU
2001 had been formulated using pre-2001 salary data, it was not surprising that
some local governments had to ask for additional funds.
It has been argued there is still another reason why local revenues might
not be adequate. This is related to how the DAU itself is formulated, espe
cially on the expenditure need side. Due to the unavailability of minimum
standards of public service, expenditure needs are approximated, not calcu
lated. This means that the estimation of expenditure needs might not reflect
the real needs of local governments. However, this argument again assumes
that it is politically feasible and fiscally affordable to develop an exhaustive
list of budgetary standards at local level. International experience shows that
these are difficult tasks to perform.
Have Transfers Been Stable?
Stability of transfers is a desirable characteristic because it facilitates local
government budgeting and planning. While flows from the DAU have been
remarkably stable, the story is very different for revenue sharing transfers.
The stability of the DAU has been based on the permanency of the funding
rule (at least 25 percent of net domestic revenue), and also on the fact that
central government allocated the funds anticipated in the budget as opposed
to the funds actually collected by the tax authorities. This arrangement has
allowed central government to transfer the DAU funds on time every month.
In contrast, for revenue sharing the transfer of funds has not been stable
and has not been on time either. Central government originally promised to
implement the actual transfer quarterly; instead, the first transfer received by
local governments occurred after six months in 2001. A similar pattern was
repeated in 2002, both for natural resources revenue sharing and for other tax
revenue sharing, due in part to the difficulty of gathering full information on
actual revenue collections in the regions. With these revenues there can be no
guarantee that the amount of sharing will be stable or similar from year to
year, but the central authorities need to make an effort to improve the fre
quency of the payments.
Is the Current System of Transfers Transparent and Simple?
The current intergovernmental system still cannot be considered reasonably
transparent and simple. For the DAU as the major part of the transfer,
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transparency has increased through different efforts such as book publica
tion, dissemination ('socialization'), and, most importantly, the use of a
standard formula to allocate the funds. However, the 2002 DAU was still
not 'simple' enough because of the pressure exercised by natural resourcerich regions and the 'hold harmless' provision insisted upon by Parliament.
The original formula might have been simple but the final formula became
quite complicated and relatively difficult to be described even by special
ists. The issue of transparency in revenue sharing is complicated by the fact
that the supporting data needed to calculate the allocations are not the type
of data that are widely available; in fact, some government agencies and
ministries still keep the data secret. Local governments naturally have had
some difficulties whenever they have tried to reconfirm the calculations.
The calculation method itself is far from simple and relatively difficult to
understand, especially for natural resource revenue sharing. As a result,
except for personal income tax revenue sharing, it is difficult for local
governments to predict their possible revenue from the revenue sharing
scheme.
Have Transfers Distorted Expenditure Decisions and Discouraged Subnational Tax Efforts?
The structure of the DAU formula takes special care not to introduce any
distortion in the expenditure decisions of local governments. All the variables
used in the estimation of expenditure needs are objectively defined and be
yond manipulation by changes in local government behavior. The big
exception, however, is the definition and computation of the 'hold harmless'
provision for 2002, which, as we have seen, is defined in terms of the local
government's wage bill for the previous year. This, of course, gives a signifi
cant incentive to local governments to increase their personnel expenditures
at the cost of other expenditure priorities.
Law No. 25/1999 implicitly introduces a hard-budget constraint for local
governments by designing DAU as a formula-based transfer and revenue
sharing as an actual revenue-based transfer. In the new set up, there should be
no room for local governments to be 'subsidized' by central government if
they have problems with their budgets. The Law clearly states that, if a local
government needs additional revenue, then it can borrow directly from finan
cial institutions or by issuing municipal bonds. However, in 2001, the hard
budget constraint was partially violated by the introduction of the contin
gency fund. As mentioned earlier, there were some good reasons why the
contingency fund had to be used. A related fact was that because of macroeconomic concerns central government, through presidential decree, prohibited
all types of local borrowing.
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What has been the effect of the new transfers on local tax efforts? Because
the DAU formula uses estimates of fiscal capacity rather than actual revenues
collected, the introduction of the new transfers should not have affected local
government 'tax efforts,' defined as the ratio of own tax and fees revenues
divided by regional gross domestic product. However, there was the possibility
of an 'income effect' whereby the new transfers may have affected tax efforts.
To test for the neutrality of the new transfer system on tax efforts, we ran a
number of regressions of tax efforts at the provincial and district/municipality
levels for 2001 and 2002 on the level of DAU transfers (as a percent of total
expenditures), and several other control variables including gross regional product
per capita. The results are shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9, where we report only
the results for 2002; the results for 2001 were very similar.
For provinces (Table 8.8), we find that the higher the DAU contribution in
provincial government expenditures, the lower local tax effort. This is a
surprising result because provincial governments were a bit shortchanged by
the DAU system in 2001, and therefore they should have made an extra effort
to collect more of their own revenues. Perhaps provincial governments were
attempting to signal to central government there was a need for contingency
funds. Also of note are the positive and significant relationships of population
density and income tax revenue sharing to tax effort. Higher population
density could indicate active economic activities that lead to higher potential
tax revenue, while higher income tax sharing indicates higher economic
capacity that should generate higher local tax revenue. For the case of dis
tricts/municipalities (Table 8.9), we find that the DAU is, as expected, an
insignificant factor in local tax effort. Among the other control variables,
income tax revenue sharing and population density contribute positively to
tax effort.
Have Transfers Been Equalizing?
It appears that DAU transfers have in general been equalizing (e.g. they have
helped dampen fiscal disparities), but not by very much, since fiscal dispari
ties (measured in local revenues per capita) after the DAU remain high. The
sharing of natural resource revenues, on the other hand, has been highly
unequalizing, which was as expected given the uneven distribution of natural
resource endowments across local governments. Other tax sharing has also
contributed to fiscal disparities.
The desired extent of equalization is still an open policy question in Indone
sia since there has never been a 'white paper' or master plan of decentralization
reform with explicitly stated objectives. The DAU itself has lacked formalized
performance criteria. This no doubt has complicated the evaluation of the
system and its reform in 2002 and later years.

Table 8.8

Explaining provincial tax efforts in 2002

Independent variable

Intercept
GRDP 1999 per capita
DAU 2002 (pet of
expenditure)
Const index
Density
Income tax (pet of
total revenue)
R2

(1)

(2)

0.35635**
0.00000566

0.8565*
0.00000916

0.0006708*

0.0006735*
-0.003837

0.205

0.255

(3)

(4)

0.7072
0.39940**
-0.00001280 -0.00000994
-0.0006429** -0.0006456

0.00007117*

0.532

Notes'.
The dependent variable in all regressions is provincial tax effort.

-0.002374
0.00006851

0.551

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.7131*
0.341139**
0.7258*
0.34046**
-0.00000591 -0.00001236 -0.00000959
-0.0000092
-0.0007340** -0.0007335** -0.0006215** -0.0006262**

0.024280**

0.023259**

0.00566
0.00008423* -0.002335
0.00008039*
0.00624

0.425

0.454

0.536

-0.002951

* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

0.554

Table 8.9

Explaining local tax efforts in 2002

Independent variable
Intercept
GRDP 1999 per capita
DAU 2002 (pet of
expenditure)
Const index
Density
Income tax (pet of
total revenue)
R2

(1)
0.5882**
-

0.00000593
0.000017

0.060

(2)

(3)

0.1720
-

-

0.0000074*
-0.000768
0.003792
0.130

0.5310*
-0.00000615
0.000211

0.00003718
0.140

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.4469*
0.4517*
0.0579
0.0008
-0.00000811* -0.00000693* -0.00000838* -0.00000688
-0.000122
0.000631
-0.000723
0.000640
0.003614

0.004715
0.00004532*
0.240

0.07912*

0.07743*

0.00001687
0.06686*

0.210

0.270

0.220

Notes:
The dependent variable in all regressions is district/municipality tax effort.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.

(8)
-0.0147
-0.00000853*
-0.000261
0.05757
0.004209*
0.00002696
0.300
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Another important complicating factor in the equalization performance of
the DAU has been the introduction of the balancing factor or 'hold harmless'
provision in the DAU. For example, using a public wage bill criterion to
distribute the balancing factor funds in 2001 and 2002 contributed to fiscal
disparities because of historical patterns of public employment.24 Basing the
balancing factor on the previous SDO and INPRES meant that local govern
ments that used to receive big transfers continued to receive them.25
Some empirical evidence on the equalization impact of transfers in 2002
is presented in Table 8.10 for provinces and Table 8.11 for districts/munici
palities. These tables show the dispersion of revenues per capita (coefficient
of variation and range between maximum and minimum values) for own
revenues, the two main categories of shared revenues, and the DAU. The
tables also show the dispersion for different cumulative arrangements of
revenue sources. We also made these calculations for 2001, with very
similar results.
In the case of the provinces, general revenue sharing and sharing of natural
resources show more dispersion than own revenues, but the cumulative distri
bution of total revenues per capita after the DAU is added has a significantly
lower dispersion. The coefficient of variation falls from 1.90 before the DAU
to 0.90 after the DAU in 2002.26 Similar results hold for districts/municipali
ties. The main contrasts are that the sharing in natural resource revenues
appears to be much more unequalizing at local level and that the DAU
distributions have a stronger equalizing effect. For example, in 2002 the
coefficient of variation for revenues per capita before the DAU is 2.58, and
drops to 1.04 after the DAU.
These results provide general evidence that the DAU has equalizing effects
at provincial and district/municipality levels. However, even after the DAU,
the coefficients of variation remain high, always with a value over one. The
very large differences between maximum and minimum values of revenues
per capita dramatize the fact that DAU is still not effective in reducing fiscal
disparities to acceptable levels.
An additional way to examine the equalization performance of the DAU is
to study whether it lives up to its promise of equalizing fiscal capacity and
expenditure needs. With this objective in mind, we ran a series of regressions
explaining DAU distributions at provincial level for 2001 and 2002 and at
district/municipality level also for 2001 and 2002. Besides using the entire
DAU allocation as the dependent variable, we also added two other depend
ent variables by breaking up the DAU allocation into the 'balancing fund
amount' and the 'formula amount.' For explanatory variables, we selected the
variable 'gross regional product per capita' (GDRPCAP) as a measure of
fiscal capacity, and we also used as a control variable 'tax effort.' For ex
planatory variables on the expenditure need side, we selected some of the
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variables used in the DAU formula, such as the construction price index and
the percent living in poverty; we also selected other variables that are reflec
tive of need and are not strictly included in the DAU formula, such as percent
of the population of retirement age, percent of population younger than
working age, and population density. We report only the results for 2002, in
Table 8.12 for provinces and Table 8.13 for districts/municipalities.
The regression results show that the DAU allocations generally do not
equalize fiscal capacity. In fact, DAU allocations per capita tend to increase
with gross regional product per capita, so that richer jurisdictions get higher
allocations. This result tends to occur largely because of the impact of the
'balancing fund'.27 On the expenditure need side, the regression results show
that typically the DAU tends to increase with poverty and the construction
price index, as expected from the role these variables play in the DAU
formula. However, the effects of these variables in the DAU allocations per
capita are often diluted, or not statistically significant. Importantly, we find
that the 'balancing fund' component of the DAU not only increases with
income, but that it also explicitly penalizes those jurisdictions with higher
expenditure needs (holding income constant). This is manifested by the nega
tive and statistically significant regression coefficients for the 'balancing
Table 8.12

Regression analysis of the DAU for provinces, 2002 (per capita
in thousands of Rp)

Independent
variable

DAU
transfers

Regional
expenditure

Balancing
fund per
capita

DAU
formula
per capita

Intercept
GRDP 1999
per capita
Const index
Poor
Older
Younger
Density
Tax effort
R2

-8.6
-0.001495

-77.9
0.007186*

18.07
0.0009881

-26.68
-0.002483

0.1888
1.6872*
-5.841
1.437
0.004222
-21.03
0.310

0.613
2.882*
-16.36
0.832
-0.008308
159.54*
0.473

-0.1415
0.5761*
-1.925
0.3186
0.001386
19.43
0.319

0.3303
1.1111
-3.916
1.1185
0.002836
^0.47
0.426

Notes:
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** Indicates statistical significance at
the 1 percent level.
Older: Percentage of the populations older than working age; Poor: Percentage of the popula
tion in poverty; Younger: Percentage of the population younger than working age.
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Table 8.13

Independent
variable
Intercept
GRDP 1999
per capita
Const index
Poor
Older
Younger
Density
Tax effort
R2

Closing the fiscal gap

Regression analysis of the DAU for districts/municipalities,
2002 (per capita in thousands ofRp)

DAU
transfers

Regional
expenditure

-837.5**
—477.2**
0.003749*
0.004521**
11.352**
-1.752
-1.30
-5.104*
-0.016025
26.47
0.326

7.5469**
-2.130*
-3.804
-1.523
-0.018058*
26.06
0.275

Balancing
fund per
capita

DAU
formula
per capita

52.9
-890.4**
0.005085**
-0.001335
3.4472**
-2.2181**
-6.277
-5.717**
-0.012169*
6.9
0.210

7.9051**
0.4656
4.981
0.614
-0.003856
19.48
0.387

Notes:
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates statistical significance at
the 1 percent level.
Older: Percentage of the populations older than working age; Poor: Percentage of the popula
tion in poverty; Younger: Percentage of the population younger than working age.

factor' on poverty and the percent of population with higher public expendi
ture needs, such as the young and the old.
In summary, the regression results provide evidence that the implementa
tion of the DAU has been pushing for conflicting objectives. The 'formula
amount' pushes for equalization, but the 'balancing factor' undermines equali
zation via its pursuit of addressing vertical imbalances. It is quite unlikely
that this is something that the policymakers in the executive and the Parlia
ment wanted, and it highlights the need to further reform Indonesia's system
of transfers.28

CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD
Indonesia has made remarkable progress over the last two years in putting
together an efficient and effective system of intergovernmental transfers. In
this very short period Indonesia has achieved what has taken other countries a
decade or longer to achieve. Progress has been most evident in the design, as
opposed to the implementation, of the DAU system of equalization transfers.
However, problems remain in a number of areas, including the DAU.
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The most fundamental problem is that the GOI has relied on the DAU to
pursue too many objectives. Although current legislation proclaims the es
sence of the DAU as an equalization grant, in practice the GOI has used the
DAU to pursue other objectives, the most significant of which are closing the
vertical balance between the central and sub-national governments and re
dressing perceived historical injustices in the allocation of revenues from
natural resources. More recently, there have been noises in government cir
cles about also using the DAU to ensure that certain national expenditure
priorities are safeguarded under decentralization.
So far, the outcome of pursuing these many policy objectives with one
policy instrument, the DAU, has been muddled or confused performance. The
equalization results the DAU achieves through its 'formula component' are to
a large extent undone by the implementation of its 'balancing factor compo
nent.' The GOI needs to develop within the system of transfers new tools to
address important policy objectives other than equalization.
The recent reforms introduced revenue sharing as an almost new instru
ment of sub-national finance in Indonesia. However, revenue sharing plays a
significant role for only a minority of sub-national governments, and those
that benefit from revenue sharing seem to be powerless in predicting how
much they are going to receive in funds during the fiscal year. The other
instrument of sub-national finance introduced by the recent reforms, the
conditional matching grants, has not been used at all.
These considerations lead us to make several general recommendations, as
well as some specific suggestions for the DAU and the DAK.
Regarding general recommendations, we believe the future reform of the
system of transfers should follow three fundamental thrusts. First, the GOI
should expand revenue autonomy at sub-national level as the best way to
address vertical imbalances. Politically, it will be hard to retrench from the
current level of revenue sharing, especially in the case of natural resource
revenues. However, little can be gained from expanding revenue sharing to
address vertical imbalances. Providing provinces and districts/municipalities
with more significant discretion over tax rates can achieve the same results
with the added benefits of increased efficiency and accountability at subnational level. Central government needs to evaluate the applicability of the
'piggybacking' system for personal income tax, but also of other taxes as a
way to provide revenue autonomy at sub-national level. Property tax should
be fully assigned at local level.
Second, the DAU must be used exclusively in the pursuit of the equaliza
tion objective. This will mean that addressing the issue of perceived historical
injustices in the sharing of revenues from natural resources will have to be
pursued though revenue sharing as is now the case, or even through special
transfers. Similarly, the general funding or vertical imbalance issue, now
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pursued with the 'balancing factor' within the DAU, needs to be addressed
through more tax autonomy, more revenue sharing, or additional transfers.
The DAU structure should be updated with the goal of improving on its
equalization performance. The GOI will need to define explicitly its equaliza
tion target and to determine whether zero or even negative allocations will be
allowed.
Third, there is widespread concern at central government level that local
governments might not pay enough attention to national priorities such as
basic education and primary health, poverty alleviation, or infrastructure
provision. The GOI needs to develop a system of conditional grants under the
legal umbrella of the DAK to pursue specific policy objectives regarding
infrastructure or particular central government programs. Because of the
importance of the health and education sectors in national priorities and the
fact that these are now the responsibilities of local governments, the GOI
could develop a system of per capita conditional grants that would ensure
minimum expenditure standards at local level in these sectors. Funding for
per capita conditional grants in health and education could come in part from
the funds now spent on the balancing factor of the DAU. These conditional
grants would provide help with a 'hold harmless' objective but would switch
funding from budget inputs (e.g. public employees) to budget outputs (e.g.
number of children educated and population at risk). The funding for condi
tional grants for infrastructure and other areas could come in part from the
still largely deconcentrated funds now controlled by the line ministries in
Jakarta.
It is important for the new set of reforms in the transfer system to be part of
the comprehensive view of where the entire system of intergovernmental
fiscal relations is going, and not just the system of transfers. But for these
reforms to fit together well, it is still necessary for the GOI to produce an
overall strategy, or 'white paper,' for reform.
Central government also needs to examine the current administrative or
ganization. In particular, should the reformed equalization transfers and the
new conditional grants flow directly from central government to local gov
ernments, or should they go through the provinces as the intermediate level of
government? This decision should be congruent with the choice made on the
overall approach to organizing intergovernmental fiscal relations.
The GOI should further consider the need for formalizing the management
of the system of DAU and DAK transfers. There is a need to collect better
statistics and to improve the existing ones. For the calculation of the DAU in
2002, for example, there are some variables still using 1999 data. Ideally, the
data used for calculating the DAU should be for two years at most prior to the
year of DAU (e.g. for DAU 2002, all data should be 2000 data). In addition,
the reliability and consistency of data essential to the DAU are sometimes
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doubtful, especially for population and area; the information on the construc
tion price index is also of questionable reliability. There is also a need to
update the equalization formula, introducing changes in the mechanism to
keep within its objectives, and to maintain a dialog with sub-national govern
ments and other stakeholders. Several government agencies currently are in
charge of administering the DAU. One possibility is whether to imitate other
countries such as Australia and India and to create a 'grants commission,' a
semi-autonomous institution at central government level that is exclusively
charged with the administration and upkeep of the transfer system. The
advantage of a 'grants commission' is its greater impartiality and objectivity
in administering the equalization grant system.
As for more specific suggestions regarding the DAU, the current practice
of distributing the DAU pool of funds as fixed in the budget is a desirable
approach because regional governments have more certainty about planning
and executing their budgets once the central budget is approved. The actual
rule of 25 percent of net domestic revenues can and should be changed in the
overhaul of the system of transfers, but it is desirable that the new percentage
should stay stable for a period of several years. Overall funding for the DAU
needs to be decided in the wider context of intergovernmental fiscal relations
and national priorities. How much of the available national resources should
be dedicated to equalizing sub-national fiscal disparities is a political deci
sion that requires the direct involvement of Parliament and the government.
However, in order to reach the right level of funding, the DAU funding rule
needs to be openly discussed and the country priorities reflected in it.
Equalization transfers in Indonesia are correctly conceived of as uncondi
tional (or general funding) grants, with their final use left to the discretion of
local governments. Pressure to impose conditionality on the use of those
funds must be resisted. Conditional grants should be used for the pursuit of
other objectives.
There is a need to remove the negative incentives that remain in the form
of using the wage bill as the basis of the distribution of finance for the 'hold
harmless' funds.
The introduction of explicit public service standards for the computation
of expenditure needs may bring more problems than benefits. Clearly, ex
penditure norms defined by the Ministry of Finance or any other agency
cannot in the present economic circumstances be anywhere near the level that
sub-national governments would consider adequate; otherwise there would
be a very significant budget deficit at sub-national or central levels. Thus the
use of explicit standards may contribute to the feelings of insensitivity and
injustice toward sub-national governments. The current approach now used in
the DAU of using an index to approximate needs is used in many other
countries.29
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There is a need for better data and improved measurements of fiscal capac
ity at provincial and local levels. Natural resources revenue sharing has to be
considered 100 percent revenue to local governments and not just 75 percent
as is now the case. Central government must not accept local government
demands to switch to actual or collected own revenues in the measurement of
fiscal capacity, as agreeing to this will certainly create negative incentives for
revenue mobilization by local governments. Instead, there is a need to de
velop better estimation methods of potential local own revenue.
Finally, we have several specific suggestions for the DAK. First, if condi
tional grants for education and health are introduced, they should be computed
on a per student and per inhabitant basis, respectively.30 This offers the
advantages of the grants being inherently equalizing, of them providing local
authorities with budgetary autonomy in terms of expenditure priorities (within
education and health), and of the grants providing the most efficient method
of service delivery.31 These grants may imply, among other things, changes in
revenue sharing and quite likely a reduction in the pool of funds dedicated to
equalization under the DAU. Second, as is the case for the DAU, the design
of conditional transfers must take into account the potential strategic behavior
of sub-national governments and the incentive signals provided to them in the
structure of capital grants. A good dose of realism will also be necessary. It
will typically be desirable that DAK grants satisfy the requirement of
'additionality,' so that capital grants are not a substitute for capital expendi
ture that sub-national governments would otherwise have undertaken. For
this reason, DAK transfers should keep the co-financing (or matching) re
quirements now in the law. Third, it will be more efficient and transparent to
allocate conditional grant funds by using objective formulas. When a formula
approach is not feasible, the allocation of funds and the selection process for
the grants should still be made according to explicitly legislated criteria.

NOTES
The authors are very grateful to James Aim for comments and Rofiq for computational assist
ance.
1. Revenue sharing on a derivation basis means that central government shares revenues with
the sub-national governments where the revenues have been collected or derived.
2. See Silver, Azis, and Schroeder (2001) for an evaluation of the SDO and INPRES sys
tems.
3. Of course, the common accusation outside Jakarta has been that central government has
practiced de facto asymmetric decentralization policies by benefiting Jakarta and more
generally Java at the cost of the other provinces. This is a complex issue. Before 1999,
there was no revenue sharing from natural resources, but rural provinces such as Papua
seem to have been favored under the INPRES system.
4. In addition, Papua gets a special grant equal to 2 percent of the DAU transfer. Another
important asymmetric benefit for these two provinces is that the additional revenue sharing

An analysis of Indonesia's transfer system

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

16.
17.

191

provided in the special autonomy laws is not to be taken into account in the computation
of fiscal capacity in the DAU formula. This benefit is on top of the general benefit that all
natural resource producing provinces and local governments receive because the measure
ment of fiscal capacity in the DAU formula in 2002 only recognizes 75 percent of shared
revenues, when all other shared revenues are recognized at 100 percent.
The current practice is to apportion PIT among jurisdictions by 'place of work' rather than
'place of residence.' This can lead to unfair apportionment of revenues among jurisdic
tions in large metropolitan areas where many individuals reside in one jurisdiction where
they consume most of their public services, but have their place of work in different
jurisdictions.
In 2001 the lump sum was determined in a residual fashion, as the moneys left after the
funds distributed through the formula and the balancing amount. The latter is defined
later.
The wage bill for each jurisdiction was computed as the money spent for that purpose in
September 2001 times.12 months.
This clearly could be the case if public employees per capita were not evenly distributed
across the territory. Historically, better off regions had more services and public bureau
crats.
Recall that revenue sharing from natural resources is not fully taken into account in the
derivation of fiscal capacity of local governments.
Law No. 25/1999 seems to be referring here to the financing of physical capital invest
ment. However, there is also the possibility of interpreting the DAK as a system of
conditional grants for current and capital expenditures.
This is a much broader term, which would seem to allow all sorts of conditional grants for
defined sectoral objectives in health, education, and so on.
This matching rule does not apply to reforestation funds.
The reforestation fees are distributed 40 percent to the producing regions while the rest is
kept by central government for reforestation activities all over the country, especially in
non-producing regions.
All four factors (population, land area, poverty, and geographical conditions as proxied by
the construction price index) are mentioned in Law No. 25/1999. A general interpretation
has been that the reference in Law No. 25/1999 does not mean that these variables need to
be entered the way they were entered in 2001, or that other variables could not be entered.
As for weights, the equal weights in 2001 were widely believed to be off the mark. For
example, population seemed to be significantly under-weighted vis-it-vis the other vari
ables. To arrive at the right weights, it is necessary to remember that the expenditure needs
index serves as a substitute for a bottom-up approach that would estimate expenditure
needs on the basis of the costs of delivering a standard basket of public services across
local governments. This bottom-up approach would be more likely to reflect disparities in
expenditure needs than a simple index. However, the bottom-up approach is more com
plex and is fraught with political complications.
Another possibility would be to introduce negative transfers or compulsory extractions
from these local governments as payments to the pool of funds to be distributed through
the equalization mechanism. This is essentially the approach adopted by countries that
have horizontally funded (also known as 'fraternal') equalization grant systems. This
approach would appear to deviate significantly from the spirit of the current DAU system.
The measure may be institutionally biased against sub-national governments since typi
cally those governments are not as free as the central government to run budget deficits
and to borrow to finance their expenditures.
The question of revenue adequacy at different levels of government must be answered
politically. For any assignment of expenditure responsibilities among different levels of
government, the revenue sources and other funding provided to sub-national governments
is a question of establishing clear national priorities. How much of the national resources
does the country wish to spend on education, health, and other sub-national expenditure
responsibilities vis-i-vis other important services, such as national defense, assigned at
the central level? These decisions about spending priorities are likely to change over time.
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and they are most conveniently made within the context of a medium-term expenditure
framework. Revenue adequacy and vertical balance should logically be interpreted within
the context of the overall constraint on public sector resources. It is always helpful to have
a national dialog on what constitutes 'adequate resources,' with participation of all
stakeholders. Although perfect consensus is unlikely to be reached, the dialog can protect
sub-national governments from central government using decentralization as a way to
solve its own fiscal shortcomings, and can also be a way to facilitate the role of the central
authorities by making sub-national governments more aware of existing fiscal constraints.
Matching arrangements help to obtain 'additionality' or 'maintenance-of-effort' in subnational expenditures, and tend to increase ownership of projects at local level.
However, often the fundamental question remains of why central authorities would have
better information than sub-national governments regarding the right input mix in the
production of sub-national public services.
Clearly, there will not be good education services, for example, if there are no funds for
books and basic supplies, regardless of the quality and newness of school buildings.
Unfortunately, this is fraught with difficulties in measuring the quantity and quality and
because of the need to avoid rewarding sub-national governments that have made clearly
voluntary decisions to spend less on capital infrastructure and more on other types of
expenditures. Capital grants should not be a substitute for prudent borrowing policies by
sub-national governments.
The most important limitations on local budget autonomy are inabilities to reduce person
nel and to set wages.
The 2001 contingency fund was budgeted at Rp 6.2 trillion of which Rp 2.8 trillion was
disbursed. In 2002 central government used the budgeted contingency fund of Rp 2.1
trillion to fund part of the 'hold harmless' funds mandated by Parliament.
See Hofman et al. (2002).
Despite the inertia introduced in the system by the balancing factor, it is interesting to
note that the new DAU system is more equalizing than the old SDO and INPRES system.
See Lewis (2001).
For 2001, the coefficient of variation falls from 1.90 before the DAU to 1.18 after the
DAU.
It is interesting that the 'DAU formula amount' for 2001 was positively and statistically
significant related to gross regional product per capita at district/municipality level, but
that this relationship did not hold for 2002.
Our regression results are generally consistent with those obtained by Lewis (2001) and
Hofman et al. (2002).
See Aim and Martinez-Vazquez (2002) for a discussion of expenditure norms.
The per capita basis could be modified, if needed, by some adjustment coefficient to
reflect different costs of provision or needs.
It must be made clear that the conditional grants should not be made for economic
categories of expenditure, such as wages and salaries. This would eliminate any of the
advantages of a decentralized delivery and implementation system and the full centraliza
tion of those services would produce the same results. Naturally, for local governments to
be able to increase efficiency in the delivery of services, it would also be necessary to
reduce, if not eliminate, central government norms and mandates that interfere with their
choices.
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APPENDIX 8.1
A.

THE 2002 AND 2001 DAU FORMULAE

2002 General Allocation Fund (DAU) Formula
I.

Fiscal Gap = Fiscal (Expenditure) Needs - Fiscal Capacity

II.

Fiscal Capacity = LORadj + (PT + LTF + PIT + 0.75*NRS)

LORadj:
PT:
LTF:
PIT:
NRS:
III.
ALE:
PI:
AI:
RPI:
CI:

Local Own Revenue Adjustment (or Predicted) = a + b*GRDP
Services
Property Tax Revenue Sharing
Land Transfer Fee Revenue Sharing
Personal Income Tax Revenue Sharing
Natural Resources Revenue Sharing
Fiscal Needs = ALE (0.4 PI + 0.1 AI + 0.1 RPI + 0.4 CI)
Average Local Expenditure
Population Index
Area Index
Relative Poverty Index
Construction Index
V.DAU, = AM + (LDW * DAUn)

Local DAU Weight (LDW) = Local Fiscal Gap/National Fiscal Gap
DAUj:
DAU for each province or district/municipality
DAUn:
DAU total, for all province or district/municipality
AM:
Minimum Allocation = LS + (a*CSS)
LS:
Lump sum equal for each province or district/municipality
a*CSS:
Proportion of Civil Servant Salary in 2001
B.
I.

2001 General Allocation Fund (DAU) Formula
Fiscal Needs

Fiscal Needs = Average Local Expenditures * l/4(Population Index + Area
Index + Construction Price Index + Poverty Index)
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Fiscal Needs Variables:
a.

Average Local Expenditures

Average Local Expenditures = (Total Local Expenditures + Deconcentrated
Funds)/Number of Local Governments
b.

Population Index
Population Index = Local Population/Average Local Population

c.

Area Index
Area Index = Local Area/Average Local Area

d.

Construction Price Index
Construction Price Index = Local Construction Price Index/100

e.

Poverty Index

Poverty Index = Number of Local Poor People/Average Local Poor People
II.

Fiscal Capacity

Fiscal Capacity = Average Local Revenue * l/3(Industrial Index + Natural
Resources Index + Human Resources Index)
Fiscal Capacity Variables:
a.

Average Local Revenue
Average Local Revenue = (Local Own Revenue + Tax Revenue Sharing)/
Number of Local Governments

b.

Natural Resources Index
Natural Resources Index = (GRDP of Natural Resources/GRDP)/
(GDP of Natural Resources/GDP)
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Industrial Index
Industrial Index = (GRDP of Non Primary Sectors/GRDP)/(GDP of Non
Primary Sectors/GDP)

d.

Human Resources Index

Human Resources Index = (Local Labor Force/Local Population)/(National
Labor Force/National Population)
III.

General Allocation Fund (GAF)

GAF of a Local Government = Fiscal (Expenditure) Needs - Fiscal Capacity
Local GAF Weight = GAF of a Local Government/GAF of All Local
Governments
GAF Distributed for a District/Muncipality = 0.9 * 0.25 * Total Domestic
Revenue in National Budget * Local GAF Weight
GAF Distributed for a Province = 0.1 * 0.25 * Total Domestic Revenue in
National Budget * Local GAF Weight
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TABLE OF VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

Variable

Definition

Units of measurement

POP

Number of people

Thousands of people

POOR

Number of people in poverty

Thousands of people

POVGAP

Poverty gap

Thousands of people

LABOR

Number of people in working
age (age 15-59)

Thousands of people

SCHOOL AGE

Number of people in school

Thousands people

OLDER

Number of people older than
working age (>59)

Thousands people

YOUNGER

Number of people younger
than working age (<15)

Thousands people

PCTPOOR

Percentage poor people of
population

Percent

PCTLABOR

Percentage working people of
population

Percent

PCT SCHOOL AGE

Percentage school age people
of population

Percent

PCT OLD

Percentage older people of
population

Percent

PCTYOUNG

Percentage younger people of
population

Percent

AREA (KM)

Land area of local authority

km2

DENSITY (PER KM)

Population/Area

People/km2

CONST INDEX

Construction price index

GRDP 1999 PER CAP

GRDP/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

TAX EFFORT (1999)

(Local Tax+User Charges)/
Population

Thousands of rupiahs

TOTAL COLLECTION
1999 PER CAPITA

Local Own Revenue/
Population

Thousands of rupiahs

REVENUE SHARE PER
CAPITA (2001)

(Tax Sharing+Natural Share)/
Population

Thousands of rupiahs
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Variable

Definition

Units of measurement

DAU 2001 PER CAPITA

DAU 2001/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

AFTER DAU 2001 PER
CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2001)/
Population

Thousands of rupiahs

AFTER ALL TRANSFER
2001 PER CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2001 +
Revenue Share//Population

Thousands of rupiahs

REGIONAL REVENUE
2001 PER CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2001 +
Revenue Share+Contingency
Fund)/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

DAU 2001 (PCT OF
EXPENDITURE)

DAU 2001/Expenditure

Percent

DAU 2002 PER CAPITA

DAU 2002/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

AFTER DAU 2002 PER
CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2002)/
Population

Thousands of rupiahs

AFTER ALL TRANSFER
2002 PER CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2002 +
Revenue Share)/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

REGIONAL REVENUE
2002 PER CAPITA

(Local Own+DAU 2002 +
Revenue Share+Contingency
Fund)/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

DAU 2002 (PCT OF
EXPENDITURE)

DAU 2002/Expenditure

Percent

EXPENDITURES 2001
PER CAPITA

Expenditure FY 1999 (with
adjustment)/Population

Thousands of rupiahs

TRANSFERS

Dau 2001 or DAU 2002

Billions of rupiahs

REVENUE SHARES

(Tax Sharing + Natural Share)

Billions of rupiahs

TOTAL COLLECTION

Local Own Revenue

Billions of rupiahs

REGIONAL REVENUE

(Local Own+DAU + Revenue
Share+Contingency Fund/
Balancing Fund)

Billions of rupiahs

AFTER TRANFERS

Local Own Revenue + DAU

Billions of rupiahs

AFTER ALL TRANSFERS

Local Own Revenue + DAU
+ Revenue Share

Billions of rupiahs

REGIONAL
EXPENDITURE

Routine Expenditure +
Development Expenditure

Billions of rupiahs

